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BOOK REVIEWS
Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value, by John Martin Fischer. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013. 256 pages. $31.95 (paperback).
SIMON KITTLE, University of Sheffield
John Martin Fischer is a proponent of what he calls an actual-sequence 
theory of moral responsibility. The central idea is that an agent’s moral 
responsibility depends on what happens in the actual world as opposed to 
what could have happened—in other words, he rejects the traditional idea 
that moral responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise. Deep Control 
is a collection of essays which motivate, defend and develop this actual-
sequence approach. All of the essays have been published before in one 
form or other, with half having been revised or significantly extended. For 
the most part they are not introductory pieces, but pick up where Fischer’s 
previous writings left off, clarifying various topics and engaging further 
with ongoing debates.
The book, which begins with a useful introduction that outlines Fischer’s 
methodology and situates his account into a wider context, is divided into 
two parts. The first part defends the actual-sequence approach to freedom 
and moral responsibility. The second part deals primarily with Fischer’s 
positive, actual-sequence theory of the freedom (or control) required for 
moral responsibility.
Fischer’s motivation for an actual-sequence theory of moral responsi-
bility comes, in part, from the idea that theories of responsibility should 
demonstrate a resilience to certain kinds of empirical discovery (3). In par-
ticular, they should not depend “on certain subtle ruminations of theo-
retical physicists” (4), by which Fischer means that they should not hinge 
on whether determinism obtains. As Fischer finds incompatibilism about 
the ability to do otherwise and causal determinism “extremely plausible” 
(16), he needs to show that an agent can be responsible without having 
the freedom to do otherwise. Fischer has long argued that Frankfurt-style 
cases support this contention and Part 1 defends this idea at length.
The first essay, “The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Story,” summa-
rizes Fischer’s latest thinking on these cases. To provide some background: 
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Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are thought-experiments that aim to show that 
the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), which states that someone 
is responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise, 
is false. Fischer presents the following example of such a case (8): Jones 
is deciding whether to vote for Obama or McCain. Black has implanted 
a chip in his brain which can monitor and control Jones’s activities. Black 
wants Jones to vote for Obama, but he doesn’t want to interfere unless it’s 
absolutely necessary. If Jones shows any inclination of deciding to vote 
McCain, Black will intervene, causing Jones to decide to vote Obama; 
otherwise, he’ll leave Jones alone. Jones, we are to suppose, deliberates and 
then votes for Obama. The (putative) point of such stories: Black’s presence 
makes it the case that Jones cannot decide to vote (or vote) McCain, but 
because Jones decided to vote for Obama “on his own,” it seems that he is 
morally responsible. Thus, PAP is false.
Little justice can be done here to the mountainous literature on such 
cases, but as so much in Fischer’s account depends on these cases being 
successful, it is worth dwelling on how he sees them working. One of 
the most powerful objections to FSCs, Fischer says (36), is the Dilemma 
Defence. It works by asking the following: “how can Black’s device help 
Black to know that Jones will choose to vote on his own for Obama?” (37). 
We are told that Black’s device detects some inclination on Jones’s part to 
decide to vote McCain. But here, the objector says, the Frankfurtian faces a 
dilemma: if that prior inclination is deterministically connected to Jones’s 
decision then the incompatibilist will be under no obligation to agree that 
Jones is responsible. On the other hand, if the prior inclination is indeter-
ministically connected to Jones’s decision, then Black’s device won’t en-
able him to expunge all of Jones’s alternatives.
Many proponents of FSCs have accepted the first point and thus tried to 
develop explicitly indeterministic cases. This route clearly avoids begging 
the question against the incompatibilist, and so, given the weight Fischer 
puts on these cases, it might be surprising to find that it is not the route 
he takes. The problem is that it’s likely to remain contentious whether the 
alternatives which persist in these indeterministic cases are relevant to 
responsibility. As a result, Fischer focuses on the deterministic horn (40).
He puts forward the following “two-step argument” (40–41). First, we 
look at FSCs in a deterministic context and conclude that if Jones is not 
morally responsible (as the incompatibilist claims), this is not because 
he lacks alternatives (contra the incompatibilist). Second, we consider 
whether there are other features of causal determinism—aside from the 
fact it rules out alternatives—that might render it incompatible with moral 
responsibility. If the answer to the latter question is No, we conclude that 
moral responsibility is compatible with determinism.
Fischer originally supported the first step with the following argument: 
Black and his device rule out Jones’s alternatives. Black and his device are 
irrelevant to Jones’s responsibility. Therefore, lacking alternatives is irrel-
evant to responsibility. Fischer now concedes that this argument is flawed 
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(42). The problem is that Black and his device only succeed in ruling out 
alternatives if determinism is also assumed. But in that case, we don’t have 
something which both rules out Jones’s alternatives and is also clearly ir-
relevant to his responsibility. Instead, Fischer asks us to assume determin-
ism obtains but remain “officially agnostic” about whether determinism 
rules out alternatives. He then goes on to say:
Suppose that Black checks and sees the “prior sign” that is associated with a 
subsequent [Obama vote]. Given that Black knows that causal determinism 
obtains, he can now relax . . . [he] knows that Jones in fact will subsequently 
choose to vote Obama. . . . It is also true, given Black’s device and disposi-
tions, that if Jones were to show the sign associated with [voting McCain] 
. . . , Black’s device would swing into action and stimulate Jones’s brain so as 
to ensure that he chooses to vote Obama. This additional fact, when added 
to the assumption of causal determinism and the fact that Black can thus 
be sure that Jones’s showing the prior sign will in fact be followed by his 
choosing accordingly, renders it true that Jones cannot . . . choose to vote for 
McCain. (42–43)
Fischer’s idea is that Black and his device, the thesis of causal determin-
ism, and the cited counterfactual, together rule out alternatives but are also 
such that they are clearly irrelevant to moral responsibility. That is what the 
conclusion requires: one thing (or collection of things) which rules out 
alternatives but which is irrelevant to responsibility.
However, this reasoning appears to succumb to the original objection. 
If we are being agnostic about whether determinism precludes alterna-
tives, and if the disputed issue is whether alternatives are relevant to 
responsibility, shouldn’t we remain agnostic about whether determinism 
precludes responsibility? Put another way: we are not (yet) assuming that 
Jones cannot involuntarily exhibit a different prior inclination (43). We’re 
assuming determinism, but also adopting the agnostic stance, which pre-
cludes us drawing that conclusion. But if it precludes us drawing that 
conclusion, then it should also preclude us from concluding that Jones 
will vote for Obama, once he’s decided to. That is, Fischer can’t claim that 
because Black knows determinism is true he also “knows that Jones . . . 
will choose to vote Obama” (42). That doesn’t follow if one has adopted 
the agnostic assumption, for just as Jones could (in a sense compatible 
with determinism) exhibit a different involuntary prior sign, so he could 
(in that same sense) change his mind after his initial decision. So Jones still 
has alternatives.
It is not clear, then, that Fischer has provided a workable Frankfurt-
style case on the deterministic horn. Still, his writing on this subject is clear 
and penetrating and (once again) moves the debate forward by highlight-
ing various issues—e.g., the interpretation of counterfactuals—that need 
to be taken into account when assessing these cases. These issues recur: 
chapter 3, a reply to a paper by Kadri Vihvelin, develops some important 
points about the interpretation of counterfactuals and when it is appropri-
ate to use them in hypothetical syllogisms—points which are then used to 
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defend Frankfurt-style argumentation. Chapter 4 discusses whether FSCs 
only work if Jones is assumed to be counterfactually stable: that is, if it is 
assumed that Jones would have done the same thing even if he could have 
done otherwise. Daniel Speak argues that this is so, and that determinism 
rules out such counterfactual stability. Fischer suggests that FSCs need not 
rely on such an idea (70).
Moving to Part 2, we find in chapters 8 and 9 that Fischer addresses, with 
a view to challenging, a distinction sometimes made between normative 
and metaphysical approaches to moral responsibility (24). Fischer discusses 
the normative approaches of Gary Watson, Susan Wolf, Angela Smith and 
R. Jay Wallace, among others. Although these theorists differ significantly 
in the accounts they offer, they appear to have two things in common. First, 
there is little focus on, if not an explicit rejection of, any kind of freedom or 
control condition on responsibility. Second, the conditions under which an 
agent is said to be morally responsible include criteria that are irreducibly 
normative. As Fischer puts it, “normative conditions play a certain kind of 
role in the analysans” (135). Thus, Watson appeals to normative competence 
(136), Wolf to the ability to act in accordance with the True and the Good 
(136), while Smith cites the importance of the agent’s evaluative judgements 
(137). Wallace invokes the idea of fairness (137, 140). Why is it unhelpful to 
group such views together as normative, and as in some way distinct from 
metaphysical views? Fischer first points out that his view, often “pigeon-
holed” as metaphysical, includes a similar commitment to normative no-
tions: according to Fischer, responsibility requires that an agent be capable 
of recognizing and responding to distinctively moral reasons (141). Next, 
Fischer asks whether those who see themselves as adopting a normative 
approach are in fact as free from the “metaphysical” issues surrounding 
control as they think. Fischer makes this question salient by pointing out 
that the conditionalist notion of freedom—the idea, employed by at least 
some who adopt the normative approach, that freedom consists in an 
agent’s actions being counterfactually dependent on his or her will—is deci-
sively refuted by Frankfurt-style cases (126–132). This is a potent challenge 
for it both highlights the commitment these writers have to some kind of 
control condition—a commitment not often emphasized—whilst also sug-
gesting that that kind of control is inadequate. This critique doesn’t imply 
that Fischer treats normative considerations as secondary. On Fischer’s own 
account the normative conditions feature heavily, being central to the rel-
evant kind of control. Fischer’s idea, I take it, is that we can (and should) 
agree with Wallace’s claim that “resolving the debate about responsibility 
will require that we venture into normative moral theory” (Responsibility 
and the Moral Sentiments [Harvard University Press, 2005], 108) but without 
thinking that this means the issue of control can therefore be neglected.
The two chapters that close out the collection both refine Fischer’s ac-
count of guidance control—the control he takes to be necessary for moral 
responsibility—in the face of recent objections. Chapter 11 addresses a 
number of putative counterexamples which target Fischer’s account of the 
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reasons-responsive mechanism that an agent needs in order to be respon-
sible. Chapter 12 addresses a challenge from Manuel Vargas concerning 
the plausibility of employing tracing in a theory of moral responsibility—
“tracing” being the idea that an agent will often be responsible for some-
thing at a time in virtue of having had control at an earlier time. Fischer’s 
responses here are clear and persuasive, although as he himself recognises, 
there are some substantial issues to do with how one should individuate 
reasons-responsive mechanisms which are left unresolved. Nevertheless, 
there is no doubt that Fischer’s account of moral responsibility is one of 
the most sophisticated ever developed and as such demands attention 
from all who write on such issues. All in all, this is a strong collection of 
essays that deserves serious study.
Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, ed. David Palmer. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014. 248 pages. $90 (hardback).
ALLISON KRILE THORNTON, Baylor University/University of Notre 
Dame
Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates is a collection of ten new essays 
on libertarianism about free will, specifically as it has been defended by 
Robert Kane, a prominent contemporary defender of the view. In addi-
tion to the essays, the collection includes a substantive introduction by the 
editor, David Palmer, and a clear and compelling final chapter in which 
Kane replies to his critics. Kane’s contribution to the volume is especially 
valuable. He both illuminates his critics’ arguments and uses the occasion 
to clarify, defend, and develop his view in important ways. Throughout, 
Kane models productive philosophical exchange. In what follows, I dis-
cuss a central thesis from each chapter and highlight Kane’s response to it.
In Part I, “Libertarian Theories of Free Will,” Carl Ginet and Timothy 
O’Connor discuss versions of libertarianism that differ according to what 
(if anything) causes free and responsible actions. According to Kane, events 
are the causes (though in his reply to O’Connor’s chapter 3 of this volume, 
he makes an important addendum). In chapters 2 and 3 respectively, Ginet 
and O’Connor defend alternatives: non-causalist and agent-causalist ac-
counts respectively.
In “Can an Indeterministic Cause Leave a Choice Up to the Agent?,” Ginet 
argues for the view that an agent’s free and responsible actions are not caused 
because, on his view, if such actions were caused (even indeterministically), 
they would be produced by antecedent circumstances, and if they were 
produced by antecedent circumstances, they would “[have] to be viewed as 
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